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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum:   
A Practitioner‘s Viewpoint 
 
MARCO SIMONS
†
 
 
 
It‘s an honor to be here among so many distinguished scholars. I 
am not a scholar myself, although I like to think that my work is 
backed up by sound scholarship most of the time. Let me say, as a 
disclaimer, that while I am a litigator and a practitioner, my remarks 
today are on behalf of myself and not on behalf of my clients. I 
litigate transnational human rights and environmental law cases, 
including some cases under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
1
 I am going 
to talk about the practitioner‘s viewpoint of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.,
2
 and what might follow from the Supreme Court‘s 
decision. I am going to start by telling a story, because that is how 
our cases start. Some of you may know this story, or think you know 
it. 
In the early 1990s, the Ogoni people of Nigeria began to 
organize into a non-violent protest movement.
3
 They were mainly 
protesting the activities of the Royal Dutch/Shell oil company 
(Shell).
4
 Shell had extracted oil from Ogoni lands for decades, 
resulting in an environmental catastrophe and countless oil spills.
5
 
 
† Legal Director, EarthRights International. This Keynote Address was delivered on 
November 16, 2012 as part of the symposium Extraterritoriality Post-Kiobel: International 
and Comparative Legal Perspectives at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law. 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
2. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  
3. See Ogoni March to Protest Oil Drilling in Nigeria, EARTH ISLAND J., June 1993, at 
33, 33 [hereinafter Ogoni March]; see also Steven Cayford, The Ogoni Uprising: Oil, 
Human Rights, and a Democratic Alternative in Nigeria, 43 AFR. TODAY 183, 187–89 
(1996) (discussing the origins of the movement). 
4. Ogoni March, supra note 3, at 33.  
5. See generally Richard Boele et al., Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. A Study in 
Unsustainable Development: I. The Story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni People, 9 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 74, 76–78 (2001) (describing the environmental impact of Shell‘s oil 
operations on the Ogoni land). 
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Natural gas is produced as part of the process of extraction, and the 
cheapest way to extract the oil involved Shell simply burning off the 
natural gas in enormous gas flares right next to Ogoni villages and 
water sources.
6
 
The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
demanded a stop to these practices, and demanded a share of the 
benefits of oil production that had been denied to them.
7
 Thousands 
of Ogoni joined the movement, marching through the streets of 
Ogoni territory.
8
 At that time, Nigeria was under military rule, so the 
regime‘s reaction to this movement was swift. Troops were sent in to 
suppress the movement—soldiers burned houses, tortured, maimed, 
raped, and killed.
9
 In the midst of this suppression, four Ogoni tribal 
chiefs were killed in what was apparently mob violence.
10
 The 
military regime used these killings as a pretext for rounding up a 
number of Ogoni leaders and accusing them of murder.
11
 Nine 
Ogonis were sentenced to death before a military tribunal that 
systematically denied the accused their rights.
12
 On November 10, 
1995, they were hanged.
13
 
Although the Ogoni were protesting against Shell‘s drilling 
activities, Shell‘s alleged involvement did not end there. On certain 
occasions, Shell called in Nigerian military troops to respond to 
various incidents.
14
 They participated in joint operations with these 
brutal military units and they paid the military forces.
15
 Allegedly, 
 
6. See Gabriel Eweje, Environmental Costs and Responsibilities Resulting from Oil 
Exploration in Developing Countries: The Case of the Niger Delta of Nigeria, 69 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 27, 39–40 (2006). 
7. MOSOP submitted the Ogoni Bill of Rights to the Federal Government of Nigeria in 
1990. MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE OGONI PEOPLE, OGONI BILL OF RIGHTS (1990). 
In the 1991 Addendum to the Ogoni Bill of Rights, MOSOP asserted, ―multi-national oil 
companies, namely Shell (Dutch/British) and Chevron (American) have severally and jointly 
devastated our environment and ecology, having flared gas in our villages for 33 years and 
caused oil spillages, blow-outs etc., and have dehumanized our people . . . .‖ Id. at 7. Further, 
MOSOP urged the international community to ―[p]revail on Shell and Chevron to stop 
flaring gas in Ogoni.‖ Id. at 8.  
8. See Boele et al, supra note 5, at 79; Ogoni March, supra note 3, at 33.  
9. Howard French, Nigeria Executes Critic of Regime; Nations Protest, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 1995, at A1.  
10. See id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(summarizing plaintiffs‘ allegations). 
15. See id. at 92–93.  
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Shell bribed witnesses to give false testimony against the ―Ogoni 
Nine.‖16 Shortly before the executions, Shell‘s director of Nigerian 
operations allegedly stated that he could essentially stop the 
executions and get the government to pull back if the Ogoni gave up 
their protest movement.
17
 
Now, you may think I am telling the story of the Kiobel case, 
and I am. Barinem Kiobel was a medical doctor, a prominent local 
official and one of the ―Ogoni Nine‖ executed on November 10, 
1995. His family came to the United States and brought suit under the 
ATS, accusing Shell of complicity in his death, among other 
abuses.
18
 But, I am also telling the story of another case—Wiwa v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
19
 Ken Saro-Wiwa, as many of you may 
know, was the leader of the MOSOP, and he was executed as well.
20
 
Saro-Wiwa‘s family also came and sued in the United States.21 
Despite their similar genesis—in fact, the same trial and executions—
the Wiwa case proceeded differently from the Kiobel case. As the 
Kiobel case was being considered by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the Wiwa case was proceeding toward trial in the district 
court.
22
 In June of 2009, on the eve of trial, Shell decided to settle 
with the Wiwa plaintiffs, and paid over fifteen million dollars.
23
 
So, you may be wondering: why did the cases turn out 
differently? Part of that is a question of civil procedure, which I will 
not get into. But another important factor is the claims that were 
alleged in these cases. Although both cases asserted claims under the 
ATS, such as torture, summary execution, and crimes against 
humanity, the Kiobel case only asserted ATS claims.
24
 The Wiwa 
case also asserted claims under common law headings such as 
 
16. Id. at 93. 
17. Report: Shell Tried to Trade Saro-Wiwa’s Freedom, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 19, 
1995. 
18. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. 
Ct. 1659 (2013). 
19. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
20. Id. at 92. 
21. Id. 
22. The Second Circuit heard arguments in Kiobel on January 12, 2009 and gave 
judgment on September 17, 2010. Kiobel, 621 F. 3d 111. In the meantime, Wiwa settled. Jad 
Mouawad, Shell Agrees To Settle Abuse Case For Millions, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at B1. 
23. Mouawad, supra note 22. 
24. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).  
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assault, battery, negligence, and wrongful death.
25
 Although the case 
settled before trial, the Wiwa plaintiffs brought claims that would 
likely still be viable, regardless of what the Supreme Court did in the 
Kiobel case. 
To understand the practical effects of the Kiobel decision, it is 
worth reviewing the unique features of the ATS, and how it fits into 
the transnational litigation picture. The ATS is not unique for 
allowing claims from around the world to be brought in U.S. courts.
26
 
Nothing in the ATS allows this, nothing in the ATS prevents it, but 
there is nothing special about the ATS in this regard. There is no 
special expansive rule of U.S. jurisdiction when it comes to ATS 
cases or human rights cases. The doctrine that allows these cases to 
be brought in the United States dates back to the eighteenth century, 
the ―transitory tort‖ doctrine.27 But there are a few things that make 
the ATS special. Of course, most notably, the ATS applies 
international law as the rule of decision.
28
 Now, in some cases, that is 
a very powerful thing. There is a benefit to using the proper labels to 
describe heinous human rights abuses. One of the reasons that 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala
29
 was brought under the ATS and not in the 
New York state court was to call torture, ―torture,‖ and not ―battery,‖ 
for example.
30
 
 
25. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 319887, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002). 
26. E.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).  
27. The transitory tort doctrine is also known as lex loci delicti. In Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit explained, ―It is not 
extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a tort claim arising outside of its territorial 
jurisdiction . . . . where the lex leci delicti commissi is applied, it is an expression of comity 
to give effect to the laws of the state where the wrong occurred.‖ For a discussion of the 
evolution of the transitory tort doctrine in U.S. case law, see Chimène Keitner, State Courts 
and Transitory Torts in Transnational Human Rights Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81, 83–
87 (2013). 
28. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (ruling that, in ATS actions, 
―courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized‖). But see Ingrid Wuerth, 
Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1931, 1934–43 (2010) (outlining possible alternative rules of decision). 
29. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
30. Cf. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (―[L]ooking to 
domestic tort law to provide the cause of action mutes the grave international law aspect of 
the tort, reducing it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort. This is not 
merely a question of formalism or even of the amount or type of damages available; rather it 
concerns the proper characterization of the kind of wrongs meant to be addressed under 
§ 1350: those perpetrated by hostis humani generis (‗enemies of all mankind‘) in 
contravention of jus cogens (preemptory norms of international law). In this light, municipal 
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On the other hand, from a very practical litigation perspective, it 
is much more difficult to prove the elements of many international 
law claims than it is to prove the elements of ordinary common law 
claims. It is easier to prove the elements of battery than to prove the 
elements of torture. I litigate environmental law cases and no ATS 
case asserting environmental claims directly has proceeded to 
judgment favorably, or even to completion favorably. Although, right 
now, there is one case involving trans-boundary environmental harm 
that may be on the right track.
31
 So, all of my environmental cases are 
transnational, but they are not ATS cases. They are ordinary 
transitory tort cases asserting ordinary toxic tort claims, like 
nuisance, battery, and negligence. 
The ATS, of course, is a jurisdictional statute and it guarantees a 
federal forum.
32
 So, maybe the Filártiga plaintiffs needed the ATS in 
order to get into federal court. Again, that is not necessarily a good 
thing from a practical litigation perspective. In many parts of the 
country, plaintiffs‘ lawyers try to stay away from federal court.33 The 
most recent significant expansion of federal jurisdiction, the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),
34
 was pushed by the defense 
bar and corporate lobbying because they wanted the protection of 
federal courts.
35
 In fact, one of my transnational environmental law 
cases was filed in California state court and we were removed to 
federal court under CAFA. 
 
tort law is an inadequate placeholder for such values.‖). See generally Paul Hoffman & Beth 
Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 9, 17–22 (2013) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of bringing 
human rights claims in state courts). 
31. See Arias v. DynCorp, 856 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2012). In Arias, Ecuadoran 
citizens brought an action against a U.S. contractor for injuries arising from fumigants 
sprayed over drug crops in Colombia. Id. at 48.  
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (―The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty 
of the United States.‖); see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713–14. 
33. See Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy 
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 57–58 (2009) (discussing the 
―real and perceived advantages‖ to plaintiffs of keeping their cases in state courts). 
34. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
35. See generally Stephen Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical 
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008).  
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Another unique aspect of the ATS is that most courts have ruled 
that it has a ten-year statute of limitations,
36
 which is a real benefit 
from a practical litigation perspective. The Kiobel case itself 
demonstrates this; it was filed in 2002, seven years after the events in 
question. Most state statutes of limitations are between one and four 
years long
37—although in one of my cases, we litigated under a 
Nigerian statute of limitations, which is six years long. In many cases 
of severe human rights abuses, courts have applied doctrines for 
tolling the statute of limitations.
38
 So, even where there are shorter 
statutes of limitations, there may be some relief from this. 
Finally, another unique aspect of the ATS is that, in at least some 
parts of the country, exhaustion of domestic remedies may be 
required.
39
 I say ―may be required‖ because nobody knows what the 
Ninth Circuit meant in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
 40
 a decision that has 
six cross-cutting non-majority opinions. But it is clear that, in some 
cases, the court could require the exhaustion of domestic remedies.   
If severe restrictions were placed on the ATS or the ATS were 
not available for transnational cases, this would be a significant blow 
to human rights cases litigation and transnational environmental 
litigation, but not a fatal blow. The Wiwa case itself gives us an idea 
of what may happen after Kiobel, regardless of what the Supreme 
Court decides. Doe I v. Unocal Corp.
41
 is another example of that. 
When we settled the Unocal case, we were proceeding to an en banc 
decision, but the other hammer against Unocal at that time was the 
 
36. See, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the ten-
year statute of limitations applicable to claims under the Torture Victim Protect Act applies 
to claims under the ATS); Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2004) (same); 
Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).  
37. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (LexisNexis 2006) (general 
three-year limitation period for civil actions); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (2000) (one-year 
limitation period for personal tort actions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09 (LexisNexis 
2010) (general four-year limitation period for tort actions).  
38. See, e.g., Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding equitable tolling of 
the limitations period warranted in an action alleging torture by a Salvadoran military 
officer); Kiwanuka v. Bakilana, 844 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2012) (equitably tolling the 
limitations period in an action against former domestic employers, which involved claims of 
involuntary servitude, human trafficking, and forced labor). 
39. See generally Regina Waugh, Exhaustion of Remedies and the Alien Tort Statute, 28 
BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 555 (2010) (discussing how various lower courts have ruled on the 
issue of exhaustion of remedies in the context of ATS litigation).  
40. 671 F.3d 736, 757 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 
133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013), dismissed on other grounds, Nos. 02–56256, 02–56390, 09–56381, 
2013 WL 3357740 (9th Cir. June 28, 2013). 
41. 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), 
appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
2-Simons 8/28/2013  9:20 PM 
34 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:28 
 
 
fact that we were proceeding to trial in California state court on 
ordinary common law claims.
42
 So while the ATS claims had been 
dismissed on appeal, we were proceeding to trial in state court.  
Turning back to the Kiobel case, I am going to do the guessing 
game about what might happen, speculate about different ways that 
the Supreme Court might come out, and discuss how that might affect 
the practice of litigation outside of the ATS. This is a difficult 
exercise. In my office, we have considered doing a betting pool on 
what the Supreme Court might decide. We ultimately gave up 
because there were far too many possibilities to be able to calculate 
it. However, I‘ll try to lay out at least a few of the potential outcomes.  
The first option, which I think reasonably likely, is that the Court 
will not actually put any new restrictions on the ATS. However, that 
is not a very interesting thing to talk about. If the Court did that, it 
would be because there are a number of other doctrines that make 
these cases hard to litigate to begin with. I will move on to the other 
possibilities and how those might affect other kinds of transnational 
litigation.  
As another option, the Court could agree with the Ninth Circuit 
and decide that exhaustion of local remedies is required.
43
 I think 
there are a number of reasons, which I will not get into, why such an 
exhaustion requirement is inappropriate in domestic transnational 
litigation. Regardless of the merits of an exhaustion requirement for 
ATS cases, nobody, to my knowledge, argues that such a requirement 
should apply to other forms of transnational litigation. The argument 
for exhaustion in the ATS cases comes out of the international law 
context and the fact that in the international human rights system, 
exhaustion is sometimes required before taking a case to an 
international human rights body. However, it is not a doctrine that 
has been applied horizontally between coequal courts in one country 
to another.  
 
42. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., No. BC237980 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2004) (denying 
Unocal‘s motion for judgment and ruling that the plaintiffs could proceed to jury trial), 
available at http://dg5vd3ocj3r4t.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/legal/doe-v-unocal-09-14-
2004.pdf. 
43. See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 757.  
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In a third scenario, the Court could decide that the ATS does not 
apply to corporations. Everybody seems to think that is unlikely.
44
 
There are some extremely pessimistic views as to why the Supreme 
Court ordered reargument.
45
 These have to do with wanting to rule 
against us on both corporate liability and extraterritoriality, and the 
Court realizing that it could not take the Rio Tinto case to rule against 
us on extraterritoriality, if it had already ruled against us on corporate 
liability.
46
 This is because in order to do that, Rio Tinto would have to 
be dismissed on that ground. I don‘t buy it. I am not on the Supreme 
Court, but regardless of whether corporate liability is knocked out of 
the ATS, again, that would seem to have no implications for litigation 
under other doctrines. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court could follow Kathleen 
Sullivan‘s argument and actually decide, based on a presumption 
against extraterritoriality, that the ATS has no extraterritorial 
application.
47
 Again, this seems unlikely. At the second oral 
argument, not even the conservative justices seemed to be buying the 
notion that the ATS has no application outside of U.S. borders; 
everybody seems to think that the ATS applies to piracy, at the very 
least.
48
 But again, this narrowing of the ATS would have no impact 
on other sorts of transnational litigation. Generally, the presumption 
against extraterritoriality simply does not come up in most transitory 
tort cases. 
That leaves a number of areas where the Supreme Court might 
decide that some sort of connection or nexus to the United States is 
necessary in order to bring an ATS case. This gets into the discussion 
of adjudicative versus prescriptive jurisdiction, and whether the 
Supreme Court will decide that some sort of basis for prescriptive 
jurisdiction is required in order to bring an alien tort case, or an 
 
44. See Susan Farbstein, Tyler Gianni & Anthony Clark Arend, Debate, The Alien Tort 
Statute and Corporate Liability, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 99, 108 (2011), 
available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ATS.pdf (criticizing a corporate 
carve-out as ―deeply inconsistent with the history, text, and purpose of the ATS‖). 
45. See, e.g., Mike Sacks, Supreme Court Expands Corporate Human Rights Case, 
Avoids Corporate Liability Question, HUFFPOST POLITICS (Mar. 5, 2012, 3:37 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/05/supreme-court-corporate-human-rights-kiobel-
royal-dutch-petroleum_n_1322007.html.  
46. Id. 
47. See Brief for Respondents at 54–55, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 
1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). 
48. For instance, at oral reargument, Justice Scalia said that he thought that the ATS‘s 
application to the high seas was ―common ground.‖ Transcript of Oral Reargument at 25, 
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1650 (No. 10-1491). 
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extraterritorial or transnational alien tort case. These could include 
nationality jurisdiction or universal jurisdiction. It could be based on 
the doctrine of forum of necessity that has been applied in some 
European countries, where a suit can be brought here if it cannot be 
brought anywhere else.
49
 Additionally, the Supreme Court might 
make up some other nexus requirement. For example, the Kiobel 
plaintiffs are residents of the United States,
50
 and maybe that is 
enough to find a nexus. 
But again, none of these bases for restricting the ATS would 
have any impact on transnational transitory tort cases outside of the 
ATS context. This is because these arguments are all based on the 
notion of prescriptive jurisdiction and the need to meet the 
international law requirements of prescriptive jurisdiction.
51
 Our 
transitory tort cases that are not under the ATS very clearly fall under 
the adjudicatory jurisdiction concept in international law.
52
 In many 
cases this involves the application of foreign law, but it involves a 
choice of law question where the court will decide what law 
appropriately applies. The question about whether the United States 
has the power to decide the case really only extends to whether the 
U.S. court has the power over the defendant. It is a question of 
personal jurisdiction, and when personal jurisdiction is present, other 
limitations on jurisdiction generally do not come up.
53
 I say 
―generally‖ because in some cases, courts have decided that laws of 
particular states have no extraterritorial application.
54
 That is an area 
in which there has been very little litigation, and I tend to think that 
sometimes judges get the law wrong. In any case, even if, for 
example, we were litigating in California and the California court 
decided that California law had no application to Nigeria, we would 
 
49. This is sometimes referred to as forum necessitatis, and has been adopted by at least 
ten E.U. member states. See ARNAUD NUYTS, STUDY ON RESIDUAL JURISDICTION 64–67 
(2007).  
50. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. 
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 403 (1987) (listing the requirements for prescriptive jurisdiction).  
52. See id. § 421 (listing the requirements for adjudicatory jurisdiction).  
53. See id. § 421(2)(a) (―In general, a state‘s exercise of jurisdiction . . . is reasonable if, 
at the time jurisdiction is asserted . . . the person or thing is present in the territory of the 
state, other than transitorily.‖) 
54. See, e.g., Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1024 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
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proceed under Nigerian law.
55
 In fact, we have done so. We went to 
trial in California on a case that included claims brought under 
Nigerian law.
56
 There is no barrier to doing that.
57
 
My ultimate point here is that whatever happens in the Kiobel 
case, it is not going to be the end of transnational litigation, it is not 
going to be the end of transnational human rights litigation, and it is 
not going to be the end of transnational environmental litigation or 
labor cases. In fact, many of the bases for narrowing the ATS would 
not even knock out that many alien tort cases. Yes, if they adopt the 
strict presumption against extraterritoriality, that would be the big 
one. However, almost every other possibility would knock out only a 
small number of existing ATS cases. For example, with regard to the 
nationality principle,
58
 Kiobel in some ways is a bad case because 
there is a more tenuous connection to the United States than in many 
alien tort cases. Most ATS cases against corporations are against U.S. 
corporations, simply because it is difficult to get personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation in the United States.
59
 Limiting 
extraterritorial ATS cases to U.S. corporate defendants would not 
knock out that many cases. The requirement of exhaustion might 
knock out some cases, but litigators have been dealing with this under 
the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)
60
 for the last twenty 
years.
61
 It has not been a significant barrier and in most of the 
countries where these cases arise, the exhaustion of remedies would 
 
55. See generally Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in 
U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 887 (2011) (discussing the application of foreign law by U.S. courts). 
56. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1968 (2012).  
57. But see Ashby Jones & Joe Palazzolo, States Target Foreign Laws, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
7, 2013, at A3 (discussing recent attempts by some states to block their courts from applying 
foreign law).  
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402(2) (1987).   
59. Personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation requires some sufficient tie to the 
state in which the action is brought. See BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 250 (2008). See generally Sean K. Hornbeck, Comment, 
Transnational Litigation and Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants, 59 ALB. L. 
REV. 1389 (1996) (describing the complex history of personal jurisdiction rules relating to 
foreign defendants). 
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006). 
61. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995) (explaining 
that exhaustion of remedies is generally not required under the TVPA ―when foreign 
remedies are unobtainable, ineffective, or obviously futile‖ (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 
10 (1991)).  
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likely be excused because it would be futile.
62
 Additionally, the 
exhaustion doctrine would present a challenge to defendants because 
they would have to show what remedies are available in foreign 
forums, and presumably would have to submit to those remedies. 
That can result in unintended consequences, as we have seen in the 
Chevron litigation with Ecuador.
63
 In one of our cases where we were 
defending a forum non conveniens motion, the defendant submitted a 
long declaration about the content of the foreign law and exactly how 
the case could be brought in a foreign forum, which was of 
tremendous help to us as we planned out our litigation in the foreign 
forum. They laid out the road map, and that is what defendants have 
to do if they want to not only win the forum non conveniens 
challenge, but also prevail on exhaustion of local remedies.
64
 
Limiting ATS cases to universal jurisdiction also would knock 
out a few cases, but most ATS cases do involve what we commonly 
consider universal jurisdiction offenses. Not all—and personally I do 
not think that they should be so limited, partly because it is difficult 
to tell where the line can be drawn on universal jurisdiction. It is 
much easier to prove something is a violation of customary 
 
62. See, e.g., Abiola v. Abubakar, 435 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (finding that 
plaintiffs had established that attempts to exhaust Nigerian remedies would be futile).  
63. Texaco (later acquired by Chevron) was sued by Ecuadorian plaintiffs in the United 
States. The action was dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, in favor of Ecuador as 
the alternative forum. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). The litigation in 
Ecuador resulted in a judgment, upheld by the Provincial Court of Sucumbios, for 
$18 billion against Chevron. Corte Provincial de Justicia de Sucumbios [Provincial Court of 
Justice of Sucumbios], Sala Unica, 3 enero 2012, Juicio No. 2011-0106 (Ecuador), available 
at http://cheverontoxico.com/assets/docs/2012-01-03-appeal-decision-english.pdf. But 
Chevron, which had once championed the credibility of the Ecuadorian courts, now claims 
that the judgment was obtained by fraud and that the courts are rife with corruption; it has 
sued the plaintiffs and some of their lawyers and consultants in New York, and Chevron has 
vowed never to pay the judgment. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012) (reversing district court grant of a world-wide 
anti-suit injunction to prevent enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment on grounds of fraud); 
Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011) (action against documentary 
filmmaker who promoted the Ecuadorians‘ cause); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 800 F. Supp. 
2d 484 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (action against plaintiffs‘ attorney).  
64. See C. Ryan Reetz, Forum Non Conveniens and the Foreign Forum: A Defense 
Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 9–20 (2004) (explaining the need for 
defendants to go beyond formal doctrine to succeed on forum non conveniens motions, and 
noting that ―[o]ne persuasive technique is to . . . illustrat[e] for the court how the litigation 
would proceed differently in the two different jurisdictions, and why the proposed alternative 
forum would resolve the parties' dispute more efficiently and effectively‖); see also 
STEPHENS ET AL, supra note 59, at 391–409 (discussing forum non conveniens and 
exhaustion arguments in transnational human rights litigation). 
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international law than it is to prove whether or not there is consensus 
on universal jurisdiction, absent a treaty specifying an obligation to 
prosecute, like the Convention Against Torture.
65
  
My ultimate takeaway from this is not to be overly optimistic 
about the prospects of human rights litigation, but it should not all be 
doom and gloom either. Regardless of what happens in Kiobel, even 
if we are not still alive through the ATS, this project will not end. We 
are not closing up shop anytime soon and the defense bar knows this 
as well. They fully recognize that few, if any, of the existing cases 
would go away completely regardless of what the Supreme Court 
does in Kiobel. 
POSTSCRIPT: WHAT HAPPENED IN KIOBEL 
Subsequent to these remarks, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
66
 Chief Justice 
Roberts‘ opinion for the Court‘s majority affirmed the dismissal of 
the Kiobel case, finding that a greater nexus to the United States was 
required, but it did so by finding that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applied to the ATS.
67
 The Court declined to address 
the original question that it certified—whether corporations can be 
sued under the ATS. 
At first blush, the majority‘s opinion would seem to wipe out all 
ATS cases where injuries occurred abroad; as noted above, a strict 
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality would be the 
most extreme limitation on the use of the ATS as a tool for promoting 
accountability for human rights violations. But a closer read suggests 
that the opinion does not go nearly that far, and that the application of 
a presumption against extraterritoriality is not so clear-cut. 
After stating all the reasons for applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the Court implied that this would be applied to 
ATS lawsuits on a case-by-case basis—that the presumption could be 
―displace[d]‖ with respect to claims that ―touch and concern the 
 
65. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; cf. 
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment 
(July 20, 2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf (affirming 
Senegal‘s obligation under the Convention either to prosecute former Chad leader Hissène 
Habré, who Belgium accused of crimes against humanity, or extradite him to Belgium).  
66. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
67. Id. at 1664. 
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territory of the United States with sufficient force.‖68 As to what 
degree of connection to the United States would be enough, the Court 
was silent—except to say that, for a foreign multinational 
corporation, ―mere corporate presence‖ does not suffice, because 
―[c]orporations are often present in many countries.‖69 
The Court‘s discussion of transitory torts is also worth noting. 
The Court acknowledged the common-law doctrine that allows 
―courts to assume jurisdiction over . . . actions for personal injury[] 
arising abroad.‖70 The Court found that doctrine to be inapposite in 
the Kiobel case, however, because such a transitory suit is predicated 
on ―a well-founded belief that it was a cause of action in that 
place.‖71 As noted above, in Kiobel, only ATS claims were brought; 
there were no ordinary transitory claims alleging that Shell‘s conduct 
would be actionable in Nigeria.  
The Court‘s opinion seems to confirm that transitory tort cases 
will, as I suggested, continue to be a viable route for transnational 
human rights cases. But it also raises a question of whether the 
presumption against extraterritoriality should be analyzed differently 
in a case such as the Wiwa case, where, unlike Kiobel, the plaintiffs 
did allege transitory tort claims as well as ATS claims.
72
 In such a 
case, the question is not whether a lawsuit against a foreign 
multinational for conduct occurring abroad should be litigated in the 
United States; the question is only whether that suit will proceed 
exclusively in state courts under common-law labels or whether, 
when that conduct also violates international law, recourse to the 
federal courts is possible. 
The fact that these questions, among others, remain open is 
supported by Justice Kennedy‘s brief concurrence. Kennedy, whose 
vote was necessary for the five-Justice majority, takes pains to 
emphasize the limited nature of the Court‘s ruling and that the 
opinion ―leave[s] open a number of significant questions regarding 
the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.‖73 
 
68. Id. at 1669. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1665. 
71. Id. at 1666 (quoting Cuba R. Co. v Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912)). 
72. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 319887, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002). 
73. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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In subsequent months and years, the federal courts will grapple 
with the question of what degree of connection to the United States is 
necessary to sustain an ATS case. Is conduct in the United States 
necessary? Is any suit against a U.S. corporation—one with more 
than ―mere corporate presence‖—permissible?74 If a suit proceeds in 
state courts regardless of ATS claims, does that change the analysis? 
What if the United States has committed to providing domestic 
remedies for universal jurisdiction offenses? Regardless of the 
answers to these questions, there is still no likelihood that 
transnational human rights litigation is going away anytime soon—
the state courts remain open to transnational lawsuits for transitory 
torts. 
 
74. Id. (majority opinion). 
